Reputation scholars in the field of regulation tend to focus on the strategic nature—or: “agency”—of reputation management. We know fairly little about the precise nature of the dynamics and conflicts between structural and agential factors that are experienced by regulators in practice, and how these dynamics impact reputation management and its outcomes. This study addresses these questions, using conceptual language from the strategic-relational approach to study the reputation management of the Belgian financial regulator during an event of high reputational salience: the global financial crisis. The results present an image of a regulator as a strategic actor who—either consciously or more intuitively—calculated its possible moves in light of a strategically selective context (which, in turn, was constantly evolving as a result of strategic actions). This contributes to a more complex and behaviorally realistic understanding of regulatory reputation management.

中文翻译：

---

声誉管理作为结构和代理的相互作用：战略关系方法

监管领域的声誉学者倾向于关注声誉管理的战略性质或“代理”。我们对监管机构在实践中经历的结构性因素和代理因素之间的动态和冲突的确切性质以及这些动态如何影响声誉管理及其结果知之甚少。本研究解决了这些问题，使用战略关系方法中的概念语言来研究比利时金融监管机构在声誉高度突出的事件：全球金融危机期间的声誉管理。结果呈现出监管者作为战略行动者的形象，无论是有意识还是更直观地，根据战略选择的背景（反过来，由于战略行动而不断发展）计算其可能采取的行动。这有助于对监管声誉管理有更复杂、更现实的理解。