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Financing strategy of transnational supply chain with vertical shareholding under tax system difference: Creditor or guarantor?
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review ( IF 10.6 ) Pub Date : 2022-11-25 , DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2022.102973
Mengyu He , Kai Kang , Xuguang Wei , Yongjian Li

Economic globalization enhances the international effect of income tax collection, which significantly impacts the taxable income and cash flow management of a transnational supply chain. This study investigates the financing preferences of the buyer and supplier in a transnational supply chain with vertical shareholding under tax symmetry and asymmetry. The buyer can act as a creditor to provide early payment financing or as a guarantor to help the supplier obtain a low-interest loan. We construct Stackelberg game models to determine the buyer’s and supplier’s equilibrium decisions and profits in two financing strategies under different tax systems. The results indicate that the buyer and supplier have inconsistent financing preferences when the supplier cannot borrow directly from the bank. The buyer always prefers to be a creditor, whereas the supplier’s financing preference depends on the trade-off between the sales revenue, production cost, financing interest, tax cost, and dividends. Surprisingly, we find an optimal shareholding ratio interval related to tax rates that can eliminate double marginalization under tax symmetry, and the supply chain can be more profitable than that under centralized decision-making. However, double marginalization cannot be eliminated under tax asymmetry. The results suggest management implications for the financing strategy choice and operational decisions of a transnational supply chain with vertical shareholding.



中文翻译:

税制差异下垂直持股跨国供应链融资策略:债权人还是担保人?

经济全球化增强了所得税征收的国际效应,对跨国供应链的应税收入和现金流管理产生重大影响。本研究调查了在税收对称和不对称情况下垂直持股的跨国供应链中买方和供应商的融资偏好。买方可以作为债权人提供提前付款融资,也可以作为担保人帮助供应商获得低息贷款。我们构建 Stackelberg 博弈模型来确定不同税收制度下两种融资策略中买方和供应商的均衡决策和利润。结果表明,当供应商不能直接从银行借款时,买方和供应商的融资偏好不一致。买家总是喜欢当债权人,而供应商的融资偏好取决于销售收入、生产成本、融资利息、税收成本和股息之间的权衡。令人惊讶的是,我们找到了一个与税率相关的最优持股比例区间,可以消除税收对称下的双重边际化,并且供应链可以比集中决策下的供应链更有利可图。然而,在税收不对称的情况下,双重边际化并不能消除。结果表明,对具有垂直持股的跨国供应链的融资策略选择和运营决策具有管理意义。我们找到了一个与税率相关的最优持股比例区间,可以消除税收对称下的双重边际化,并且供应链可以比集中决策下的供应链更有利可图。然而,在税收不对称的情况下,双重边际化并不能消除。结果表明,对具有垂直持股的跨国供应链的融资策略选择和运营决策具有管理意义。我们找到了一个与税率相关的最优持股比例区间,可以消除税收对称下的双重边际化,并且供应链可以比集中决策下的供应链更有利可图。然而,在税收不对称的情况下,双重边际化并不能消除。结果表明,对具有垂直持股的跨国供应链的融资策略选择和运营决策具有管理意义。

更新日期:2022-11-25
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