This research investigates cost-efficient manufacturer technology licensing strategies for three cost-differential manufacturers that produce partially substitutable products. Among a technology innovator, a mid-cost manufacturer, and a high-cost manufacturer; four strategies are considered including: competition; licensing of the technology by the innovator to either the mid- or high-cost manufacturer exclusively; and licensing of the technology to both the mid- and high-cost manufacturers. Following the modeling framework of an oligopolistic competition, we derive the equilibrium solutions for the alternative licensing strategies and explore the optimal strategy by evaluating the profits of the licensor, licensee(s) and unlicensed manufacturer in the different licensing models. We find that each of the four licensing strategies has the potential to deliver the best economic performance, but the optimal strategy in a given situation depends on the unit production cost differences among the three manufacturers. The underlying principle that determines it is the trade-off between the economic gain and loss from technology licensing, which is influenced by differences in production costs, market competition intensity, and the power relationship between licensor and licensee(s). Licensing coopetition between an innovator and a licensee could force an unlicensed manufacturer to exit the market, highlighting the interactive effect of coopetition in a triad. We also find that licensing cost-reducing technology among competitors will always improve social welfare compared with competition. Although the improvement in social welfare is mainly driven by increased economic performance of the manufacturers, it is not necessarily at the expense of customers with decreased consumer surplus.

本研究调查了生产部分可替代产品的三个成本差异制造商的成本效益制造商技术许可策略。在技​​术创新者、中等成本制造商和高成本制造商之间；考虑了四种策略，包括：竞争；创新者将技术独家许可给中等或高成本制造商；以及向中高成本制造商授予技术许可。遵循寡头垄断竞争的建模框架，我们推导出替代许可策略的均衡解决方案，并通过评估不同许可模型中许可方、被许可方和未许可制造商的利润来探索最优策略。我们发现四种许可策略中的每一种都有可能提供最佳的经济绩效，但在给定情况下的最佳策略取决于三个制造商之间的单位生产成本差异。决定它的基本原则是技术许可的经济收益和损失之间的权衡，它受到生产成本差异、市场竞争强度以及许可人和被许可人之间的权力关系的影响。创新者和被许可人之间的许可合作可能会迫使未获得许可的制造商退出市场，突出三位一体中合作竞争的互动效应。我们还发现，与竞争相比，竞争者之间许可降低成本的技术总能提高社会福利。