Primitivist theories of truth have been defended by some of the luminaries of analytic philosophy, including the early Moore and Russell, Frege, Davidson, and Sosa. In this paper, I take up a contemporary primitivist theory that has been systematically developed throughout a sizeable body of work but has yet to receive sustained critical attention—Jamin Asay's primitivist deflationism. Asay's major ambitions are to defend a novel primitivist account of the concept truth and to harmonise that account with a deflationary theory of the property truth. I will elaborate a thoroughgoing critique of primitivist deflationism, arguing that we have reason to doubt all of the five theses that constitute the view. Along the way, I will also highlight a number of possible escape routes for the primitivist deflationist, explaining how they can make the view more resilient even as they compel us to rework some of its central commitments.

中文翻译：

---

真理是原始的吗？

一些分析哲学的杰出人物，包括早期的摩尔和罗素、弗雷格、戴维森和索萨，都在捍卫原始主义的真理理论。在本文中，我采用了一种当代原始主义理论，该理论已在大量著作中得到系统发展，但尚未受到持续的批判性关注——Jamin Asay 的原始主义紧缩论。Asay 的主要目标是捍卫一种新颖的原始主义对概念真理的解释，并使该解释与属性真理的紧缩理论协调一致。我将详细阐述对原始主义紧缩论的彻底批判，认为我们有理由怀疑构成该观点的所有五个论点。在此过程中，我还将强调原始主义紧缩主义者的一些可能的逃生路线，