We study the roles of the head office (HO) and the business units (BUs) of a multinational corporation (MNC) in reducing income tax and tariff payments through internal transfer prices in international trades. Using confidential transfer price data of a large MNC, we analyze how the different elements of internal transfer prices set by the HO and BUs vary differently from external prices with income tax rates, tariff rates, and the tradeoff between the two. Absent severe agency conflicts, we find that the BUs contribute more to tax planning than the HO, despite that explicit incentives to do so are not included in the compensation schemes. The roles of the HO and BUs vary with product market competition, the risk of conflicts with tax and customs authorities, and agency problems within the firm. Moreover, we provide evidence of strategic trade cost allocations among BUs to reduce income taxes.

我们研究跨国公司 (MNC) 的总部 (HO) 和业务部门 (BU) 在通过国际贸易中的内部转移价格减少所得税和关税支付方面的作用。使用大型跨国公司的保密转让价格数据，我们分析了 HO 和 BU 设定的内部转让价格的不同要素与外部价格的所得税率、关税税率以及两者之间的权衡有何不同。在没有严重的代理冲突的情况下，我们发现 BU 比 HO 对税收规划的贡献更大，尽管这样做的明确激励不包括在补偿计划中。HO 和 BU 的角色因产品市场竞争、与税务和海关当局发生冲突的风险以及公司内部的代理问题而异。而且，