Truth appears to be a predicate of sentence-like structures. This raises the question of what a sentence is (or what it is to be sentence-like) such that it is truth-apt. A natural move is to treat sentences and truth-aptness as somehow conceptually or metaphysical coeval—made for each other. This resolution conflicts, however, with now standard approaches in syntactic theory that treat sentences as mere epiphenomena. Siding with the developments in syntax, the paper argues that truth-aptness properly belongs, not to sentences, but to clauses as structures that can be selected by verbs that specify truth-apt states. It is further argued that this arrangement is perfectly consistent with truth-conditional semantics.

中文翻译：

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句法、真理和句子的命运

真理似乎是类似句子结构的谓词。这就提出了一个句子是什么（或者它是什么是类似句子的）的问题，以至于它是适合真值的。一个自然的举动是将句子和真实性视为某种概念上或形而上学的同时存在——为彼此而生。然而，该解决方案与句法理论中现在将句子视为仅仅是附带现象的标准方法相冲突。考虑到句法的发展，本文认为真值适切性不属于句子，而是从句作为结构，这些结构可以由指定真值状态的动词选择。进一步认为，这种安排与真值条件语义完全一致。