Traditionally epistemologists have taken doxastic states to come in three varieties—belief, disbelief, and suspension. Recently many epistemologists have taken our doxastic condition to be usefully represented by credences—quantified degrees of belief. Moreover, some have thought that this new credal picture is sufficient to account for everything we want to explain with the old traditional picture. Therefore, belief, disbelief, and suspension must map onto the new picture somehow. In this paper I challenge that possibility. Approaching the question from the angle of suspension, I argue that all possible credal accounts face serious challenges. They either (i) falsify central claims that uphold the credal picture itself or (ii) do not permit suspension in cases where it is permissible or (iii) rule out the possibility of plainly possible confidence comparisons.

中文翻译：

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暂停对信用账户的信任

传统上，认识论者将信仰状态分为三种：相信、怀疑和悬置。最近，许多认识论者认为我们的信念状况可以用信用（量化的信仰程度）来有效地表示。此外，有些人认为这个新的信用图片足以解释我们想要用旧的传统图片解释的一切。因此，相信、怀疑和悬念必须以某种方式映射到新的图景上。在本文中，我对这种可能性提出了质疑。从暂停的角度来处理这个问题，我认为所有可能的信用账户都面临着严峻的挑战。它们要么（i）伪造支持信用图本身的核心主张，要么（ii）在允许的情况下不允许暂停，要么（iii）排除明显可能的置信度比较的可能性。