We aim to show from a new perspective that Quine’s ontological relativity, based largely on his so-called “proxy-function argument”, falls short of being a rigorously coherent philosophical conception, as it exhibits significant formal defects. This new perspective enables exposing the shortcomings of Quine's position and suggests a possible reformulation of the original position. Moreover, we argue that his ontological relativity is inconsistent with the empirical data associated with some of our best physical theories, such as quantum mechanics. We refer to fundamental concepts of philosophy and the foundations of mathematics in order to clarify our critique of Quine’s position concerning the relation between formalized theories and both what we can know about the real world and how we come to know it.

我们的目标是从一个新的角度表明，奎因的本体论相对论，主要基于他所谓的“代理功能论证”，由于它表现出明显的形式缺陷，它并没有成为一个严格连贯的哲学概念。这种新观点能够揭露奎因立场的缺点，并建议对原始立场进行可能的重新表述。此外，我们认为他的本体论相对论与与我们的一些最佳物理理论相关的经验数据不一致，例如量子力学。我们参考哲学的基本概念和数学的基础，以澄清我们对奎因关于形式化理论与我们对现实世界的了解以及我们如何了解它之间关系的立场的批评。