State estimation algorithms deployed in modern grids are vulnerable towards false data injection attacks. This work demonstrates a novel attack vector (AV) formulation scheme by exploiting the low-rank subspace of the topology matrix. With constraints over the state deviation vector, this work showcases that the developed AV can effectively bypass the residue test for a demonstrated test bench.

中文翻译：

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基于CUR低秩分解方法的新型虚假数据注入攻击公式

现代网格中部署的状态估计算法容易受到虚假数据注入攻击。这项工作通过利用拓扑矩阵的低秩子空间展示了一种新颖的攻击向量 (AV) 公式化方案。由于对状态偏差向量的限制，这项工作表明开发的 AV 可以有效地绕过已演示测试台的残留测试。