Exploring the evolution of cooperation has garnered increasing interest in a variety of fields, yet the majority of existing models assume that individuals’ preferences are fixed and stable. Preference reversal, a systematic disparity between people’s valuations and choices, implies that individuals’ preferences are inherently unstable and changing. To better understand how cooperation evolves, we develop a simple model with preference reversal in the context of the public goods game, in which the decision on whether and how to punish defectors is heavily influenced by the cooperators’ preference for punishment in two decision-making processes. We explore the effects of preference reversal on the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in infinitely well-mixed populations. We also specify the scenarios where preference reversal favors cooperation. The chance of preference reversal as well as the predisposing conditions for preference reversal are critical in determining whether preference reversal facilitates the emergence of cooperation.

探索合作的演变已经在各个领域引起了越来越多的兴趣，但大多数现有模型都假设个人的偏好是固定和稳定的。偏好逆转是人们的评价和选择之间的系统性差异，意味着个人的偏好本质上是不稳定和不断变化的。为了更好地理解合作是如何演变的，我们在公共产品博弈的背景下开发了一个简单的偏好反转模型，其中关于是否惩罚叛逃者以及如何惩罚叛逃者的决定在很大程度上受到合作者在两次决策中的惩罚偏好的影响。过程。我们探讨了偏好反转对无限混合种群中合作进化动态的影响。我们还指定了偏好逆转有利于合作的场景。