The primary goal of this paper is to provide substantial motivation for exploring an Acquaintance account of phenomenal consciousness, on which what fundamentally explains phenomenal consciousness is the relation of acquaintance. Its secondary goal is to take a few steps towards such an account. Roughly, my argument proceeds as follows. Motivated by prioritizing naturalization, the debate about the nature of phenomenal consciousness has been almost monopolized by representational theories (first-order and meta-representational). Among them, Self-Representationalism is by far the most antecedently promising (or so I argue). However, on thorough inspection, Self-Representationalism turns out not explanatorily or theoretically better than the Acquaintance account. Indeed, the latter seems to be superior in at least some important respects. Therefore, at the very least, there are good reasons to take the Acquaintance account into serious consideration as an alternative to representational theories. The positive contribution of this paper is a sketch of an account of consciousness on which phenomenal consciousness is explained partly in representationalist terms, but where a crucial role is played by the relation of acquaintance.

本文的主要目的是为探索熟人对现象意识的解释提供实质性的动力，在此基础上，从根本上解释现象意识的是熟人的关系。. 它的次要目标是朝着这样的帐户迈出几步。大致来说，我的论点如下进行。由于优先考虑自然化，关于现象意识本质的辩论几乎被表征理论（一阶和元表征）所垄断。其中，自我表征主义是迄今为止最有前途的（或者我认为）。然而，经过彻底检查，自我表征主义在解释上或理论上并不比熟人帐户更好。事实上，后者似乎至少在某些重要方面更胜一筹。因此，至少，有充分的理由将熟人考虑作为表征理论的替代方案。