The emergence of bureaucracy is often described as occurring at a particular historical period in a society, as a result of the pressures of war, the improvement of communication and transportation technologies, or societywide cultural changes. But recently many scholars have drawn attention to examples of meritocratic bureaucracies in societies otherwise organized according to patrimonial logics, what I call proto-bureaucracies. In this article I investigate one aspect of proto-bureaucracies that has not been examined in the literature: in a society characterized by patrimonial relations, the sudden introduction of meritocratic principles of recruitment may be interpreted as violating the principles of rewarding loyalty or kinship. This can fragment the political coalitions necessary to sustain a proto-bureaucracy. I argue through in-depth examination of one case, and secondary analysis of several others, that to manage the problem of exclusion successful proto-bureaucracies enact performative adherence to nonmeritocratic logics while protecting their meritocratic core. I argue that understanding contemporary proto-bureaucracies can help to develop an organizational strategy for strengthening governance and reducing corruption. The main lesson of proto-bureaucracies is that effective institutions generate exclusion, but meritocratic practices can be sustained if the exclusions they generate can be addressed in other ways.

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官僚主义的出现通常被描述为发生在一个社会的特定历史时期，由于战争的压力、通讯和运输技术的改进，或全社会的文化变革。但最近，许多学者开始关注社会中的精英官僚机构的例子，这些社会是按照世袭逻辑组织的，我称之为原始官僚机构。在这篇文章中，我研究了文献中没有研究过的原始官僚制度的一个方面：在一个以世袭关系为特征的社会中，突然引入精英招聘原则可能被解释为违反了奖励忠诚或亲属关系的原则。这可能会分裂维持原始官僚机构所需的政治联盟。我通过对一个案例的深入研究和对其他几个案例的二次分析认为，为了解决排斥问题，成功的原始官僚机构在保护其精英核心的同时，对非精英逻辑进行了表演性坚持。我认为，了解当代原始官僚机构有助于制定加强治理和减少腐败的组织战略。原始官僚体制的主要教训是，有效的制度会产生排斥，但如果可以通过其他方式解决它们产生的排斥，精英管理的做法就可以持续下去。我认为，了解当代原始官僚机构有助于制定加强治理和减少腐败的组织战略。原始官僚体制的主要教训是，有效的制度会产生排斥，但如果可以通过其他方式解决它们产生的排斥，精英管理的做法就可以持续下去。我认为，了解当代原始官僚机构有助于制定加强治理和减少腐败的组织战略。原始官僚体制的主要教训是，有效的制度会产生排斥，但如果可以通过其他方式解决它们产生的排斥，精英管理的做法就可以持续下去。

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