We study the real effects of certification to demonstrate the value of mandatory certification over and above mandatory disclosure in enhancing investment efficiency. In our model, a firm's manager selects a project to maximize the firm's short-term stock price, which is a function of her certification and disclosure decisions about the outcome of the project. Although the manager might be either forthcoming or strategic with regard to the disclosure of her private information, she can strategically choose whether to incur a cost or not to certify her disclosure, unless mandated. The manager always selects the first-best project when both certification and disclosure are mandatory. However, when certification is voluntary, project selection is inefficient. In addition, mandating disclosure without mandating certification can lead to lower investment efficiency than mandating neither. In justifying why mandatory certification is beneficial for public firms, our results offer a note of caution regarding the contemplated regulatory moves for increased disclosures by public firms without corresponding certification requirements, for example, the recent SEC proposal requiring extensive climate-related disclosure.

中文翻译：

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强制认证的价值：实效视角

我们研究认证的实际效果，以证明强制认证在提高投资效率方面的价值高于强制披露。在我们的模型中，一家公司的经理选择一个项目来最大化公司的短期股票价格，这是她对项目结果的认证和披露决定的函数。尽管经理在披露她的私人信息方面可能是主动的或有策略的，但她可以有策略地选择是否承担费用来证明她的披露，除非强制要求。当认证和披露都是强制性的时，经理总是选择最好的项目。然而，当认证是自愿的时，项目选择是低效的。此外，强制披露而不强制认证可能会导致投资效率低于两者都不强制的投资效率。在证明为什么强制认证对上市公司有利时，我们的结果提醒人们注意在没有相应认证要求的情况下为上市公司增加披露而预期的监管举措，例如，最近美国证券交易委员会提议要求进行广泛的气候相关披露。