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Leveraging weakness into strength: how neo-patrimonial oil-producing countries survive economic crises
Journal of International Relations and Development ( IF 1.333 ) Pub Date : 2022-09-09 , DOI: 10.1057/s41268-022-00271-1
Daniel S Leon 1 , Charles Larratt-Smith 2
Affiliation  

Most scholarship on major oil-producing countries (OPCs) focuses on their illiberal characteristics, but scant research explores how these regimes react to periodic oil price collapses, particularly neo-patrimonial OPCs with relatively low state capacity, herein termed gatekeeper OPCs. These OPCs should be extremely vulnerable to regime change during economic crises. However, since the most recent collapse in international oil markets in 2014, almost all neo-patrimonial OPCs have managed to weather the ensuing fallout, thereby begging the question of how these seemingly vulnerable regimes manage to survive extended periods of economic crises. We hypothesise that the likelihood of regime survival in neo-patrimonial OPCs depends on a strategic calibration of domestic neo-patrimonial policies, such as clientelism and executive aggrandisement, and the skilled navigation of global geopolitics. We find evidence that incumbent governments leverage international geopolitical tensions during economic crises to secure valuable foreign aid from key allies, which allows them to maintain the domestic neo-patrimonial strategies required to safeguard their power. We reached the above finding through a nested mixed-methods research design combining quantitative analysis of 35 major OPCs from 2011 to 2018 using Cox proportional hazards models with the qualitative comparison of two gatekeeper OPCs—Chad and Venezuela.



中文翻译:

化弱为强:新世袭产油国如何度过经济危机

大多数关于主要产油国 (OPC) 的学术研究都集中在它们的不自由特征上,但很少有研究探讨这些政权如何应对周期性油价暴跌,特别是国家能力相对较低的新世袭产油国,这里称为看门人 OPC。这些 OPC 在经济危机期间应该极易受到政权更迭的影响。然而,自 2014 年国际石油市场最近一次崩盘以来,几乎所有新世代相传的 OPC 都设法经受住了随之而来的后果,从而引出了这些看似脆弱的政权如何在长期的经济危机中生存下来的问题。我们假设新世袭 OPC 政权生存的可能性取决于国内新世袭政策的战略校准,例如庇护主义和行政扩张,以及全球地缘政治的熟练导航。我们发现证据表明,现任政府在经济危机期间利用国际地缘政治紧张局势从主要盟友那里获得有价值的外国援助,这使他们能够维持维护其权力所需的国内新世袭战略。我们通过嵌套混合方法研究设计得出上述发现,该设计结合使用 Cox 比例风险模型对 2011 年至 2018 年 35 个主要 OPC 进行的定量分析,以及两个看门人 OPC(乍得和委内瑞拉)的定性比较。这使他们能够维持维护其权力所需的国内新世袭制战略。我们通过嵌套混合方法研究设计得出上述发现,该设计结合使用 Cox 比例风险模型对 2011 年至 2018 年 35 个主要 OPC 进行的定量分析,以及两个看门人 OPC(乍得和委内瑞拉)的定性比较。这使他们能够维持维护其权力所需的国内新世袭制战略。我们通过嵌套混合方法研究设计得出上述发现,该设计结合使用 Cox 比例风险模型对 2011 年至 2018 年 35 个主要 OPC 进行的定量分析,以及两个看门人 OPC(乍得和委内瑞拉)的定性比较。

更新日期:2022-09-09
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