We analyze the effect of managerial entrenchment on firms' corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. We use the cross-shareholding ratio and the stable shareholders ratio, which characterize the Japanese corporate system, as proxy variables for managerial entrenchment. We choose two CSR/environmental, social, and corporate governance scores: those for vendors targeting only Japan and those for vendors targeting the entire world. The results show that increases in the cross-shareholding and stable shareholder ratios decrease CSR activities. These results are consistent with the view that CSR activities are considered a costly investment for managers rather than a type of agency cost. Finally, we reveal that after the enactment of Japan's Corporate Governance Code in 2015, the cross-shareholding and the stable shareholder ratios have not significantly affected CSR activities and that foreign institutional investors have promoted CSR activities.

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利益相关者参与作为可持续发展战略：交叉持股的管理壁垒

我们分析了管理壁垒对公司企业社会责任 (CSR) 活动的影响。我们使用日本公司制度特有的交叉持股比例和稳定的股东比例作为经营权防御的代理变量。我们选择了两个 CSR/环境、社会和公司治理分数：针对仅针对日本的供应商的分数和针对全球的供应商的分数。结果表明，交叉持股的增加和股东比例的稳定会降低企业社会责任活动。这些结果与 CSR 活动被认为是管理者的一项昂贵投资而不是一种代理成本的观点是一致的。最后，我们透露，在 2015 年日本公司治理准则颁布后，