We analyze nearly 7,000 shareholder activist campaigns across 56 countries and show that shareholder activism is now a global phenomenon. Our analyses provide evidence on factors that explain the spread of activism and two related questions. First, we measure the extent to which country-level governance regulations facilitate shareholder engagement, a necessary condition for activism, and show that our measure of shareholder-empowering governance regulation explains cross-country variation in the emergence of activism. Second, we show that changes in these regulations also affect outcomes for firms that face a high threat of activism but that are not targeted by activists (i.e., there are spillovers)—including increased profitability, higher payouts, and reduced investment. These effects are most pronounced in countries with weak minority shareholder rights, where activism had previously been relatively unimportant.

我们分析了近 7,000 名股东维权人士在 56 个国家/地区开展的活动表明，股东激进主义现已成为一种全球现象。我们的分析提供了解释激进主义传播的因素和两个相关问题的证据。首先，我们衡量了国家层面的治理法规在多大程度上促进了股东参与，这是激进主义的必要条件，并表明我们对股东赋权治理监管的衡量解释了激进主义出现的跨国差异。其次，我们表明，这些法规的变化也会影响那些面临激进主义高威胁但未成为激进主义目标（即存在溢出效应）的公司的结果——包括盈利能力提高、支出增加和投资减少。这些影响在少数股东权利薄弱的国家最为明显，