Institutions often own equity in multiple firms that compete in the same product market. Prior research has shown that these institutional “common owners” induce anticompetitive pricing behavior in the airline industry. This paper reevaluates this evidence and shows that the documented positive correlation between common ownership and airline ticket prices stems from the market share component of the common ownership measure, and not the ownership and control components. We further show that the results are sensitive to measures of investor control and to assumptions about equity holders' ownership and control during bankruptcy.

中文翻译：

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共同所有权对航空业没有反竞争作用

机构通常拥有在同一产品市场上竞争的多家公司的股权。先前的研究表明，这些机构“共同所有者”在航空业中引发了反竞争的定价行为。本文重新评估了这一证据，并表明共同所有权与机票价格之间的记录正相关源于共同所有权衡量的市场份额部分，而不是所有权和控制部分。我们进一步表明，结果对投资者控制措施以及破产期间股权持有人的所有权和控制权的假设很敏感。