Abstract

The early history of the postwar West German foreign intelligence service is replete with accounts of former Nazi security officers who were recruited by the newly founded service thanks to their professional experience, connections, and anti-Soviet credentials, only to later be exposed as Soviet moles. Focusing on the case of Heinz Felfe, this article puts forward the argument that the reaction of a secret service to the impending exposure of moles can be even more harmful than their actual activity. Enemy moles in intelligence organizations are dangerous in more than one way. They cause damage, of course, when they operate in the dark, but also cause just as much, and even more, damage when exposed. The fear of public scandal incentivizes irrational behavior, aggravating rather than decreasing the dangers facing the service.

摘要

战后西德外国情报局的早期历史充斥着前纳粹安全官员的记述，他们凭借专业经验、人脉和反苏资历被新成立的情报局招募，但后来被揭露为苏联内奸. 本文以海因茨·费尔夫 (Heinz Felfe) 的案例为中心，提出这样的论点，即特工部门对即将曝光的内奸的反应可能比他们的实际活动更有害。情报组织中的敌方内奸不止以一种方式危险。当然，当它们在黑暗中工作时，它们会造成损坏，但在暴露在外时也会造成同样多甚至更多的损坏。对公共丑闻的恐惧会激发非理性行为，加剧而不是减少服务面临的危险。