Can fictions make genuine assertions about the actual world? Proponents of the ‘Assertion View’ answer the question affirmatively: they hold that authors can assert, by means of explicit statements that are part of the work of fiction, that something is actually the case in the real world. The ‘Nonassertion’ View firmly denies this possibility. In this paper, I defend a nuanced version of the Nonassertion View. I argue that even if fictions cannot assert, they can indirectly communicate that what is recounted as fictional is actually true. I show that this view is supported by independent linguistic data, and that it is able to defuse the objections that are typically raised against the Nonassertion View. I conclude by showing that this position has some interesting implications for testimonial cognitivism about fiction.

中文翻译：

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旨在说真话的小说

虚构可以对现实世界做出真实的断言吗？“断言观点”的支持者肯定地回答了这个问题：他们认为作者可以通过作为小说作品一部分的明确陈述断言现实世界中确实存在某些情况。“非断言”观点坚决否认这种可能性。在本文中，我为非断言观点的细微差别辩护。我认为，即使虚构不能断言，它们也可以间接传达被叙述为虚构的东西实际上是真实的。我表明这种观点得到了独立语言数据的支持，并且能够化解通常针对非断言观点提出的反对意见。最后，我表明这一立场对关于小说的见证认知主义有一些有趣的影响。