According to Sider, a question is metaphysically substantive just in case it has a single most natural answer. Recently, Barnes and Mikkola have argued that, given this notion of substantivity, many of the central questions in the metaphysics of gender are nonsubstantive. Specifically, it is plausible that gender pluralism—the view that there are multiple, equally natural gender kinds—is true, but this view seems incompatible with the substantivity of gender. The goal of this paper is to argue that the notion of substantivity can be understood in a way that accommodates gender pluralism. First, I claim that gender terms (at least as used in the ontology room) are referentially indeterminate, where referential indeterminacy holds in virtue of the way the world is. Second, I propose a degree-theoretic (or scalar) account of metaphysical substantivity; genders are substantial to the degree that they are determinate. I conclude that gender is relatively, although not absolutely, substantial.

中文翻译：

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性别的形而上学（相对）重要

西德认为，一个问题在形而上学上是实质性的，只要它有一个最自然的答案。最近，巴恩斯和米科拉认为，鉴于这种实质性概念，性别形而上学中的许多核心问题都是非实质性的。具体来说，性别多元化——即存在多种、同样自然的性别类型的观点——似乎是正确的，但这种观点似乎与性别的实质性不相容。本文的目的是论证实质性概念可以以适应性别多元化的方式来理解。首先，我声称性别术语（至少在本体论室中使用的）是指称不确定的，其中指称不确定性取决于世界的现状。第二，我提出了形而上学实质性的度理论（或标量）解释；性别的重要性在于它们是确定的。我的结论是，性别是相对重要的，尽管不是绝对重要的。