We examine how creditor protection affects firms with different levels of owners' and managers' personal costs of bankruptcy (PCB). Theoretically, we show that firms with high PCB borrow and invest more under a more debtor-friendly management stay system, whereas firms with low PCB borrow and invest more under a more creditor-friendly receivership system. Intuitively, stronger creditor protection relaxes financial constraints but reduces credit demand. Which effect dominates depends on owners' and managers' PCB. Empirically, we find support for these predictions using a Korean bankruptcy reform that replaced receivership with management stay.

中文翻译：

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破产法何时应该对债权人或债务人友好？理论与证据

我们研究了债权人保护如何影响拥有不同级别所有者和经理的个人破产成本 (PCB) 的公司。从理论上讲，我们表明，在对债务人更友好的管理留存制度下，PCB 高的公司借贷和投资更多，而 PCB 低的公司在债权人友好的接管制度下借贷和投资更多。直观地说，更强的债权人保护会放松金融约束，但会减少信贷需求。哪种效果占主导地位取决于所有者和管理者的 PCB。根据经验，我们通过韩国破产改革来支持这些预测，该改革以管理层留下来取代接管。