Studies suggest that home countries impose economic sanctions following host state expropriation of home firms. However, and not addressed in the empirical literature, is the possibility that sanctions lead targeted countries to nationalize firms from sender countries. Using bilateral expropriation data from 1985 to 2010, and controlling for endogeneity issues, we find that sanctions significantly increase expropriation risk, encouraging targeted states to inflict pain in a reciprocal manner on sender countries. Expropriations also enable targeted nations to acquire economic assets from foreign firms, undermining the restricting goals of sanctioning states, and provide opportunities for leaders to show political resolve at home by standing up to senders. Our results are robust using monadic or dyadic data and different statistical methods, indicating another sanction-busting strategy used by targeted countries.

研究表明，在东道国没收本国公司后，母国会实施经济制裁。然而，在实证文献中没有提到的是，制裁导致目标国家将来自发送国的公司国有化的可能性。使用 1985 年至 2010 年的双边征用数据，并控制内生性问题，我们发现制裁显着增加征用风险，鼓励目标国家以对等方式对发送国造成痛苦。征用还使目标国家能够从外国公司获得经济资产，从而破坏制裁国家的限制性目标，并为领导人提供机会通过对抗发送者在国内展示政治决心。使用一元或二元数据和不同的统计方法，我们的结果是稳健的，