Although the concept of human dignity is absent from the text of the European Convention on Human Rights, it is mentioned in more than 2100 judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. The judges at the Court have used dignity to develop the scope of Convention rights, but also to signal to respondent states just how serious a violation is and to nudge them toward better compliance. However, these strategies reach dead ends when the Court is faced with government submissions that are based on a conception of dignity that is different from the notion of human dignity relied on by the Court. Through empirical analysis and by focusing on Russia, the country against which the term dignity is used most frequently, the paper maps out situations of conceptual contestation and overlap. We reveal how the Court strategically uses mirroring, substitutes dignity for other Convention values, or altogether avoids confrontation. In such situations, the Court’s use (and non-use) of dignity becomes less about persuading states to comply with the Convention and more about preserving its authority and managing its relationship with states.

中文翻译：

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语言和说服：欧洲人权法院的人的尊严

尽管《欧洲人权公约》的文本中没有人的尊严的概念，但在欧洲人权法院的 2100 多项判决中都提到了这一概念。法院的法官利用尊严来扩大公约权利的范围，同时也向被告州表明违规行为的严重程度，并推动他们更好地遵守。然而，当法院面临基于与法院所依赖的人类尊严概念不同的尊严概念的政府意见书时，这些策略就会陷入死胡同。通过实证分析，并通过关注俄罗斯这个最常使用尊严一词的国家，本文描绘了概念争论和重叠的情况。我们揭示了法院如何战略性地使用镜像，用尊严代替其他公约价值观，或完全避免对抗。在这种情况下，法院对尊严的使用（和不使用）不再是为了说服各国遵守公约，而是为了维护其权威和管理其与各国的关系。