In this paper, I argue that accounts of the normative basis of morality face the following puzzle, drawing on a case found in Susan Wolf’s influential discussion of conflicts between the moral and personal points of view. On the one hand, morality appears to constitute an independent point of view that can intelligibly conflict with, and can conceivably be overruled by, the verdicts of other points of view. On the other hand, moral demands appear to carry a distinctive sort of authority; moral reasons normally seem to take priority over other kinds of considerations, and the verdicts of morality seem to possess a distinctive place in our deliberations, in that they appear to represent standards that we are open to legitimate complaint for failing to honor. After clarifying the nature of the problem, I argue that a contractualist theory of morality can resolve the puzzle by offering a compelling vindication of the independence of the moral perspective, the normal priority of moral reasons, and the deliberative significance of moral verdicts, within a unified theoretical framework. Furthermore, I claim that this contractualist analysis can help account for the sense of deep conflict that is characteristic of the sort of troubling moral choices that Wolf calls to our attention.

在本文中，我认为道德规范基础的描述面临以下难题，并借鉴了苏珊·沃尔夫（Susan Wolf）对道德和个人观点之间冲突的有影响力的讨论中发现的一个案例。一方面，道德似乎构成了一种独立的观点，可以理解地与其他观点的裁决发生冲突，并且可以想象被其他观点的裁决推翻。另一方面，道德要求似乎带有一种独特的权威。道德理由通常似乎优先于其他类型的考虑，道德裁决似乎在我们的审议中占有独特的地位，因为它们似乎代表了我们对未能遵守的合法投诉持开放态度的标准。弄清楚问题的本质后，我认为，契约主义的道德理论可以通过在统一的理论框架内为道德观点的独立性、道德理由的正常优先性和道德裁决的审议意义提供令人信服的辩护来解决这个难题。此外，我声称这种契约主义分析可以帮助解释沃尔夫引起我们注意的那种令人不安的道德选择所特有的深刻冲突感。