Credit sales not only help sellers expand sale size and promote competitiveness, but also relieve the pressure of customers cash flow, but inevitably increases channel conflict and generates capital opportunity cost. This article attempts to consider a dual-channel supply chain operation decision and coordination under credit sales transactions for the first time, in which the supplier and the retailer compete on the credit period provided to the final customers, and the market demand is random and depends on credit period. This paper develops and analyzes the mathematical models of the dual-channel supply chain expected profit maximization under centralized, decentralized and coordinated decision making structures. A decision framework for a dual-channel supply chain considering credit sales competition and random demand is given, in which the supplier decides on wholesale price and online direct sales channel credit period, and the retailer decides on traditional retail channel credit period. This study finds that the fierce credit sales competition is bad for the dual-channel supply chain, and classical coordination contracts such as wholesale price joint trade credit contract have limitations in the dual-channel supply chain coordination considering credit sales competition. To stimulate channel members to make optimal decisions while optimizing their expected profits, a two-part credit contract based on asymmetric Nash bargaining is proposed. The research results reveal that the proposed contract can not only achieve the dual-channel supply chain coordination considering credit sales competition, but also achieve Pareto improvements of all members. Finally, the performance of different models is compared by numerical examples and sensitivity analyses, the effectiveness of the proposed contract is proved, and some managerial insights are given.

赊销不仅可以帮助卖家扩大销售规模，提升竞争力，也可以缓解客户现金流压力，但不可避免地会增加渠道冲突，产生资金机会成本。本文首次尝试考虑赊销交易下的双渠道供应链运营决策与协调，其中供应商和零售商竞争提供给最终客户的信用期限，市场需求是随机的，取决于在信用期。本文开发和分析了集中式、分散式和协同决策结构下双渠道供应链预期利润最大化的数学模型。给出了考虑赊销竞争和随机需求的双渠道供应链决策框架，其中供应商决定批发价和网络直销渠道信用期，零售商决定传统零售渠道信用期。本研究发现，激烈的赊销竞争对双渠道供应链不利，批发价格联合贸易信用合同等经典协调合同在考虑赊销竞争的双渠道供应链协调中存在局限性。为了激励渠道成员在优化预期利润的同时做出最优决策，提出了一种基于非对称纳什议价的两部分信用合约。研究结果表明，所提出的合同不仅可以实现考虑赊销竞争的双渠道供应链协调，而且可以实现所有成员的帕累托改进。最后，