We present a game-theoretic approach to the analysis of the emergence or survival of buffer states. We analyze a two-stage game with three players orderly located on a linear territory, where the player in the middle is passive, and the players on the two ends are aggressive with options to declare war against the others. We conduct an equilibrium analysis and characterize the conditions under which the passive player acts as a buffer state between the aggressive players. We find various equilibrium outcomes, which can be grouped into the following categories: (i) peace with buffer, (ii) peace without buffer, and (iii) the last man standing. Our comparative static analyses reveal valuable insights regarding the factors affecting the existence of buffer states.

我们提出了一种博弈论方法来分析缓冲状态的出现或生存。我们分析了一个两阶段的博弈，三个玩家有序地分布在一个线性区域上，中间的玩家是被动的，两端的玩家是激进的，有向其他玩家宣战的选择。我们进行了均衡分析，并描述了被动玩家在激进玩家之间充当缓冲状态的条件。我们发现各种均衡结果，可分为以下几类：（i）有缓冲的和平，（ii）没有缓冲的和平，以及（iii ）） 剩下的最后一位。我们的比较静态分析揭示了有关影响缓冲状态存在的因素的宝贵见解。