While the percentage of mature firms with classified boards or dual class shares has declined by more than 40% since 1990, the percentage of IPO firms with these structures has doubled over this period. We test whether IPO firms implement these structures optimally or whether they are utilized to allow managers to protect their private benefits of control. Both shareholder voting patterns and changes in firm types going public suggest that the Agency Hypothesis best explains IPO firm's use of dual class, particularly when there is a large voting-cash flow wedge. In contrast, among firms with high information asymmetry, classified board structures are better explained by the Optimal Governance hypothesis.

自 1990 年以来，拥有分类董事会或双重股权的成熟公司的百分比下降了 40% 以上，而拥有这些结构的 IPO 公司的百分比在此期间翻了一番。我们测试了 IPO 公司是否以最佳方式实施这些结构，或者它们是否被用来让管理者保护他们的私人控制利益。股东投票模式和上市公司类型的变化都表明，代理假设最好地解释了 IPO 公司使用双重类别，特别是当存在较大的投票现金流楔时。相比之下，在信息高度不对称的公司中，分类董事会结构可以更好地用最优治理假设来解释。