Motivated by the asymmetric information inherent to cyberwarfare, we examine a game of deterrence between an attacker and a defender in which the defender can signal its retaliatory capability but can only imperfectly attribute an attack. We show that there are equilibria in which the defender sends noisy signals to increase its expected payoff. In some equilibria, the defender can use signaling to deter an attacker and increase its payoff. In a different and somewhat counter-intuitive equilibrium, the defender can increase its expected payoff through signaling by luring the attacker to attack more.

中文翻译：

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归属不完善和信号无法验证的网络威慑

受网络战固有的信息不对称的启发，我们研究了攻击者和防御者之间的威慑博弈，其中防御者可以发出其报复能力的信号，但只能不完美地归因于攻击。我们表明存在平衡，其中防御者发送噪声信号以增加其预期收益。在某些均衡中，防御者可以使用信号来阻止攻击者并增加其收益。在一个不同的且有点违反直觉的均衡中，防御者可以通过引诱攻击者进行更多攻击来发出信号来增加其预期收益。