If moral status depends on the capacity for consciousness, what kind of consciousness matters exactly? Two popular answers are that any kind of consciousness matters (Broad Sentientism), and that what matters is the capacity for pleasure and suffering (Narrow Sentientism). I argue that the broad answer is too broad, while the narrow answer is likely too narrow, as Chalmers has recently argued by appeal to ‘philosophical Vulcans’. I defend a middle position, Motivational Sentientism, on which what matters is motivating consciousness: any kind of consciousness which presents its subject with reasons for action.

中文翻译：

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感觉主义、动机和哲学火神

如果道德地位取决于意识能力，那么究竟什么样的意识才是重要的呢？两个流行的答案是任何类型的意识都很重要（广义知觉主义），重要的是快乐和痛苦的能力（狭义知觉主义）。我认为广泛的答案过于宽泛，而狭义的答案可能过于狭窄，正如查默斯最近通过诉诸“哲学火神”所争论的那样。我捍卫一个中间立场，动机感觉主义，在这个立场上，重要的是动机意识：任何一种向其主体提出行动理由的意识。