Abstract

This paper analyses regret. On the basis of a number of examples, the case is made that regret is a negative affective state that has a perceived past choice as its object. More precisely, S regrets φ-ing, iff, and because (i) S has a negative affective state regarding φ-ing (Negative Affect State Requirement), the experience of which is explained by (ii) S perceiving that an alternative choice that was available to her would have been preferable to φ-ing (Perceived Forking Path Requirement). The resulting account is differentiated from Williams’ agent-regret and shown to avoid problems faced by Zeelenberg’s definition of regret.

摘要

本文分析遗憾。根据一些例子，我们认为遗憾是一种消极的情感状态，它以过去的选择为对象。更准确地说，S 后悔 φ-ing，当且当，并且因为 (i) S 对 φ-ing（负向情感状态要求）有一个消极的情感状态，其经验可以通过 (ii) S 感知到一个替代选择来解释：对她来说可能比 φ-ing（感知分叉路径要求）更可取。由此产生的帐户与威廉姆斯的代理遗憾区分开来，并显示出避免了泽伦伯格对遗憾的定义所面临的问题。