Although most takeover theories presume the acquirers initiate the transactions, many transactions are in reality initiated by targets. This paper attempts to understand such a target’s sellout timing and pricing decisions by developing a target-initiated model, in which the firm randomly and periodically meets high- and low-type acquirers and makes take-it-or-leave-it price offers. The model captures the illiquidity and heterogeneity of sellout opportunities. Optimally, the firm takes either a high-price strategy—making only a high-price offer in a good economic state— or a flexible strategy—even making a low-price offer in a very good economic state— based on a tradeoff between sellout pricing and timing efficiency. With higher frequency and heterogeneity of acquirers, the firm makes a high-price offer more eagerly and a low-price offer more restrictively. With asymmetric information, where the acquirer types are unobservable, the firm reduces the acquirer’s information rent by making a high-price offer more eagerly and restricting a low-price offer more severely. With higher economic state volatility, the low-type sellout probability increases because the economic state has a higher potential to increase beyond the low-price sellout threshold. The jump in firm value at the sellout time (i.e., target stock price reaction) is not monotonic with respect to the economic state and arrival rate due to the interactions between the sellout price and timing.

尽管大多数收购理论都假设收购方发起交易，但实际上许多交易是由目标发起的。本文试图通过开发一个目标发起的模型来理解此类目标的出售时机和定价决策，在该模型中，公司随机和定期会见高低类型的收购者，并提出要么接受要么放弃的报价。该模型捕捉到售罄机会的非流动性和异质性。最佳情况下，公司要么采取高价策略——只在良好的经济状态下提供高价报价——要么采取灵活的策略——甚至在非常好的经济状态下提供低价报价——基于售罄和销售之间的权衡定价和时间效率。随着收单方的频率和异质性越来越高，该公司更热衷于提供高价，而提供更严格的低价。在信息不对称的情况下，收购方的类型是不可观察的，公司通过更热切地提供高价报价和更严格地限制低价报价来减少收购方的信息租金。随着经济状态波动性的增加，低价卖出概率增加，因为经济状态有更高的潜力增加到超过低价卖出阈值。由于卖出价格和时机之间的相互作用，卖出时公司价值的跳跃（即目标股价反应）对于经济状态和到达率不是单调的。公司通过更积极地提供高价报价和更严格地限制低价报价来减少收购方的信息租金。随着经济状态波动性的增加，低价抛售概率增加，因为经济状态有更高的潜力增加超过低价抛售阈值。由于卖出价格和时机之间的相互作用，卖出时公司价值的跳跃（即目标股价反应）对于经济状态和到达率不是单调的。公司通过更积极地提供高价报价和更严格地限制低价报价来减少收购方的信息租金。随着经济状态波动性的增加，低价抛售概率增加，因为经济状态有更高的潜力增加超过低价抛售阈值。由于卖出价格和时机之间的相互作用，卖出时公司价值的跳跃（即目标股价反应）对于经济状态和到达率不是单调的。