Among the most surprising claims in The Methods of Ethics is Sidgwick’s assertion that his key ethical axioms are corroborated by Kant. This article analyses Sidgwick’s claim that his axioms of justice and benevolence closely correspond to particular features in Kant. I shall argue that his claim of agreement with Kant was a serious overstatement. In particular, the restrictions which Sidgwick places on his acceptance of Kant’s universal law formula of the categorical imperative (FUL) seem to call into question whether the alleged convergence with the axiom of justice has a solid basis. Further, Sidgwick seemed unaware of a crucial aspect of Kant’s conception of the humanity formula that constitutes a substantial divide between their views on benevolence. The upshot is that the divide between Kantian and Sidgwickian ethics appears deeper than Sidgwick seemed to realize. This analysis is confirmed by Sidgwick’s famous worries regarding freedom and the existence of God in Kant’s work.

《伦理学方法》中最令人惊讶的主张之一是 Sidgwick 的断言，即他的关键伦理公理得到了康德的证实。本文分析了 Sidgwick 的主张，即他的正义和仁慈公理与康德的特定特征密切相关。我将争辩说，他声称同意康德是一种严重的夸大其词。特别是，西奇威克对他接受康德的绝对命令（FUL）的普遍法则公式所施加的限制似乎让人质疑所谓的与正义公理的融合是否有坚实的基础。此外，西奇威克似乎没有意识到康德的人性公式概念的一个关键方面，它构成了他们对仁慈的看法之间的巨大分歧。结果是康德和西奇威克伦理学之间的分歧似乎比西奇威克似乎意识到的要深。