We investigate how to secure reliable access to personal protective equipment (PPE) in pandemics, which are characterized by random occurrences and durations, at the lowest expected cost. The policymaker’s strategy is based on a mix of (1) holding ready-to-use strategic stockpile that is acquired at regular price but incurs a holding cost, (2) building partnership with PPE manufacturers to relocate offshore production locally, which guarantees some local supply but requires offering subsidies, and (3) buying PPE from the spot market, which is characterized by long supply lead times and high prices.

We model the problem as a Stackelberg game between a policymaker (leader) and a manufacturer (follower). The policymaker decides the PPE stockpile, the subsidy offered to the local manufacturer, and the quantity to buy from the spot market. The manufacturer determines whether to move production onshore. We determine the optimal strategy for each player and study the effect of spot market conditions and pandemic characteristics.

Analytical results show that attracting local manufacturers is less costly for the government when the variability of pandemic duration increases. While it is sub-optimal to rely only on the strategic stockpile, holding some stockpile may be necessary even when the PPE can be obtained from the spot market as soon as the pandemic starts. Results reveal policymaker’s preference for subsidizing onshore production in the following cases: products with low spot prices (counter-intuitively), spot market with long supply lead time, less frequent pandemics, and shorter pandemics.

我们研究如何以最低的预期成本确保在流行病中可靠地获得个人防护设备 (PPE)，流行病的特点是随机发生和持续时间。政策制定者的战略基于以下组合：(1) 持有以正常价格收购但会产生持有成本的即用型战略储备，(2) 与 PPE 制造商建立合作伙伴关系，将离岸生产转移到当地，这保证了一些当地供应但需要提供补贴，以及（3）从现货市场购买PPE，其特点是交货周期长，价格高。

我们将问题建模为政策制定者（领导者）和制造商（追随者）之间的 Stackelberg 博弈。政策制定者决定 PPE 库存、向当地制造商提供的补贴以及从现货市场购买的数量。制造商决定是否将生产转移到陆上。我们为每个参与者确定最佳策略，并研究现货市场状况和流行病特征的影响。

分析结果表明，当大流行持续时间的可变性增加时，吸引本地制造商对政府来说成本更低。虽然仅依靠战略储备并非最佳选择，但即使疫情一开始就可以从现货市场获得个人防护装备，持有一些储备可能也是必要的。结果显示，政策制定者倾向于在以下情况下补贴陆上生产：现货价格低（与直觉相反）的产品、供应提前期长的现货市场、流行病发生频率较低和流行病持续时间较短的产品。