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Against Sethi’s response to the Argument from Hallucination
Philosophical Psychology ( IF 1.573 ) Pub Date : 2022-07-10 , DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2099368 David Mathers
Philosophical Psychology ( IF 1.573 ) Pub Date : 2022-07-10 , DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2099368 David Mathers
Sethi (2020) attempts to show that even if we keep Price’s intuition: the claim that having an experience as of an F make us aware of an instance of Fness, we can still block the Argument from Hall...
中文翻译：
反对塞西对幻觉论点的回应
Sethi (2020) 试图证明，即使我们保留普莱斯的直觉：声称拥有 F 的经验使我们意识到 Fness 的实例，我们仍然可以阻止霍尔的论证......
更新日期：2022-07-10
中文翻译：
反对塞西对幻觉论点的回应
Sethi (2020) 试图证明，即使我们保留普莱斯的直觉：声称拥有 F 的经验使我们意识到 Fness 的实例，我们仍然可以阻止霍尔的论证......
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