Does electoral competition affect expenditures on the provision of public goods in electoral autocracies? Previous studies firmly agree that multiparty elections are critical to autocratic survival. Accordingly, studies argue that multiparty elections lead to an increase in health expenditure in electoral autocracies. In addition to the literature, less explored is the effect of electoral competition on the expenditure. If oppositions can run elections with a higher level of electoral competition and threaten the dictator's winning over elections, would autocrats provide more public goods to citizens? This paper raises a pessimistic view on this question and argues that the impact of electoral competition does not affect government health expenditure. Empirical findings with 291 cases of 70 electoral autocracies from 2000 to 2018 and an illustrative case study of Armenia demonstrate that autocrats are less likely to provide health and education expenditures to citizens even though they face higher competition during elections.

选举竞争是否会影响选举专制国家提供公共产品的支出？以前的研究坚定地认为，多党选举对于独裁的生存至关重要。因此，研究认为，多党选举导致选举专制国家的卫生支出增加。除文献外，较少探讨的是选举竞争对支出的影响。如果反对派可以举办更高水平的选举竞争，并威胁独裁者对选举的胜利，那么独裁者会为公民提供更多的公共物品吗？本文对这个问题提出了悲观的看法，认为选举竞争的影响并不影响政府的卫生支出。