Abstract

In this paper I present a critique of some aspects of Thad Metz’s attempt to develop an African moral theory grounded on the value of ubuntu. I question the sense in which this theory is African, as well as his attempt to ground human rights on his single value theory of ubuntu. In a number of publications Thad Metz has given a clear, analytic account of what ubuntu is. Metz’s work on ubuntu does two things: 1) explains the content of ubuntu: what the value/virtue is; 2) presents a moral theory according to which appealing to ubuntu as a basic value enables us to explain what makes all actions right or wrong. He calls this an African moral theory. It is the second part I am skeptical about. He makes it plausible that ubuntu is an important value. And he shows how we can give it some clear content. However, I argue that he does not make plausible a single-value ethical theory based on ubuntu; it is not plausible as an ethical theory, and it is not plausible that such a theory is African in any significant sense.

摘要

在本文中，我对 Thad Metz 试图发展基​​于 ubuntu 价值的非洲道德理论的某些方面提出了批评。我质疑这种理论在何种意义上是非洲的，以及他试图将人权建立在他的 ubuntu 单一价值理论之上。在许多出版物中，Thad Metz 对 ubuntu 是什么给出了清晰的分析说明。Metz 在 ubuntu 上的工作做了两件事：1）解释了 ubuntu 的内容：价值/美德是什么；2) 提出了一种道德理论，根据该理论，将 ubuntu 视为基本价值使我们能够解释是什么使所有行为正确或错误。他称之为非洲道德理论。这是我怀疑的第二部分。他认为 ubuntu 是一个重要的价值是有道理的。他展示了我们如何给它一些清晰的内容。然而，我认为他没有使基于 ubuntu 的单一价值伦理理论变得合理；它作为一种伦理理论是不合理的，而且这种理论在任何重要意义上都是非洲的也不合理。