I raise three related objections to aspects of Katharina Kraus’s interpretation in Kant on Self-Knowledge and Self-Formation. First, I reject her claim that representations count as merely subjectively valid for Kant if they represent objects from the contingent perspective of a particular subject. I argue that Kant in fact describes consciousness of subjectively valid representations as consciousness of one’s own perceptions rather than of the objects perceived, and therefore that it plays a bigger role in his account of self-consciousness than Kraus allows. Second, whereas Kraus argues that the transcendental unity of apperception structures the content of any consciousness that is possible for a subject, I note that Kant also allows for a merely empirical unity of apperception, which he describes as in principle different from transcendental unity. Finally, I raise some worries for Kraus’s suggestion that we can be aware of the activity of thinking through inner sense.

我对 Katharina Kraus 在康德关于自我认识和自我形成的解释方面提出了三个相关的反对意见。首先，我拒绝她的主张，即如果表征从特定主体的偶然视角来表征对象，那么表征仅仅对康德来说是主观有效的。我认为康德实际上将主观有效表征的意识描述为对自己感知的意识，而不是对被感知对象的意识，因此它在他对自我意识的解释中发挥了比克劳斯所允许的更大的作用。其次，克劳斯认为，统觉的先验统一构成了任何事物的内容。对于主体可能的意识，我注意到康德也允许纯粹经验的统觉统一，他将其描述为原则上不同于先验统一。最后，我对克劳斯的建议提出了一些担忧，即我们可以通过内在感觉来意识到思考的活动。