We can use radically different reference-schemes to generate the same truth-conditions for the sentences of a language. In this paper, we do three things. (1) Distinguish two arguments that deploy this observation to derive different conclusions. The first argues that reference is radically indeterminate: there is no fact of the matter what ordinary terms refer to. This threat is taken seriously and most contemporary metasemantic theories come with resources intended to rebut it. The second argues for radical parochialism about reference: it's a reflection of our parochial interests, rather than the nature of the subject matter, that our theorizing about language appeals to reference rather than another relation that generates the same truth-conditions. Rebuttals of the first argument cut no ice against the second, because radical parochialism is compatible with reference being determinate. (2) Argue that radical parochialism, like radical indeterminacy, would be shocking if true. (3) Argue that the case for radical parochialism turns on the explanatory purposes of “reference”-talk: on relatively “thin” conceptions, the argument goes through, and radical parochialism is (shockingly!) true; on richer conceptions, the argument can be blocked. We conclude that non-revisionists must endorse, and justify, a relatively rich conception of the explanatory purposes of “reference”-talk.

中文翻译：

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关于参考的激进狭隘主义

我们可以使用完全不同的参考方案来为语言的句子生成相同的真值条件。在本文中，我们做了三件事。(1) 区分运用这一观察结果得出不同结论的两个论点。第一种观点认为，指称根本上是不确定的：不存在普通术语所指称的事实。这种威胁受到认真对待，大多数当代元语义理论都附带了旨在反驳它的资源。第二个主张关于指称的激进狭隘主义：我们关于语言的理论化诉诸参照而不是产生相同真理条件的另一种关系，这反映了我们的狭隘利益，而不是主题的本质。对第一个论点的反驳对第二个论点没有任何影响，因为激进的狭隘主义与指称的确定性是相容的。(2) 认为激进的狭隘主义，就像激进的不确定性一样，如果属实，将会令人震惊。（3）论证激进狭隘主义的理由取决于“参考”谈话的解释目的：在相对“薄弱”的概念上，论证是通过的，激进狭隘主义是（令人震惊的！）真实的；在更丰富的概念上，论证可以被阻止。我们的结论是，非修正主义者必须认可并证明“参考”谈话的解释目的的相对丰富的概念。