Perceptual experiences are not immediately responsive to reasons. You see a stick submerged in a glass of water as bent no matter how much you know about light refraction. Due to this isolation from reasons, perception is traditionally considered outside the scope of epistemic evaluability as justified or unjustified. Is perception really as independent from reasons as visual illusions make it out to be? I argue no, drawing on psychological evidence from perceptual learning. The flexibility of perceptual learning is a way of responding to new epistemic reasons. The resulting perceptual experiences are epistemically evaluable as justified or unjustified.

中文翻译：

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感性学习和原因反应

知觉体验不会立即对原因做出反应。无论您对光折射了解多少，您都会看到一根浸入一杯水中的棍子是弯曲的。由于这种与原因的隔离，传统上认为感知在认知可评估性的范围之外是合理的或不合理的。感知真的像视觉错觉那样独立于理性吗？我认为不，根据感知学习的心理学证据。知觉学习的灵活性是对新的认知原因做出反应的一种方式。由此产生的知觉体验在认知上可评价为合理的或不合理的。