Do the oppressed have an epistemic advantage when it comes to knowing about the systems that oppress them? If so, what explains this advantage? In this paper, I consider whether an epistemic advantage can be derived from the oppressed's contingent tendency to have more relevant experiences and motivation than the non-oppressed; or, alternatively, whether an advantage derives from the oppressed's very lived experience, thus being in principle unavailable to the non-oppressed. I then explore the potential role of knowledge-how for explaining an epistemic advantage. Ultimately, I conclude that the oppressed tend to have a contingent advantage, while rejecting that they have one in principle, except for when their phenomenological experience has an effect on the veracity of the claims they make. This has the important upshot that privileged people are not epistemically disadvantaged in principle and are thus often blameworthy for their ignorance about oppression.

中文翻译：

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被压迫有认知上的优势吗？

当被压迫者了解压迫他们的制度时，他们是否具有认知优势？如果是这样，如何解释这一优势？在本文中，我考虑是否可以从被压迫者比非受压迫者拥有更多相关经验和动机的偶然倾向中得出认知优势？或者，另一种选择是，某种优势是否源自被压迫者的亲身经历，因此原则上非被压迫者无法获得这种优势。然后，我探讨了知识如何在解释认知优势方面的潜在作用。最终，我的结论是，被压迫者往往拥有偶然优势，但原则上拒绝承认他们拥有这种优势，除非他们的现象学经验对他们所提出的主张的真实性产生影响。