These remarks focus on Kraus’s claim that for Kant the category of substance cannot apply to the soul but that instead we can and should apply a merely regulative idea of the soul. While granting Kraus’s contention that we require an idea of the soul in order to investigate inner experience, I argue that the category of substance nonetheless applies to the soul, but that the notion of the soul as entirely non-corporeal is a regulative idea. To explore this contention, I closely examine two crucial passages Kraus uses to argue against parity between inner and outer sense.

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灵魂的理念是什么？对 Katharina Kraus、康德关于自我认识和自我形成的评论

这些评论集中在克劳斯的主张上，即对于康德来说，实体的范畴不能应用于灵魂，而是我们可以而且应该应用一个仅仅是调节性的灵魂观念。虽然承认克劳斯的论点，即我们需要灵魂的概念来研究内在体验，但我认为实体的范畴仍然适用于灵魂，但灵魂完全非物质的概念是一种调节性的概念。为了探讨这一论点，我仔细研究了克劳斯用来反对内在意义和外在意义之间的平等的两个关键段落。