A recurring theme dominates recent philosophical debates about the nature of conscious perception: naïve realism's opponents claim that the view is directly contradicted by empirical science. I argue that, despite their current popularity, empirical arguments against naïve realism are fundamentally flawed. The non-empirical premises needed to get from empirical scientific findings to substantive philosophical conclusions are ones the naïve realist is known to reject. Even granting the contentious premises, the empirical findings do not undermine the theory, given its overall philosophical commitments. Thus, contemporary empirical research fails to supply any new argumentative force against naïve realism. I conclude that, as philosophers of mind, we would be better served spending a bit less time trying to wield empirical science as a cudgel against our opponents, and a bit more time working through the implications of each other's views – something we can accomplish perfectly well from the comfort of our armchairs.

中文翻译：

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捍卫扶手椅：反对知觉哲学中的经验论据

最近关于意识知觉本质的哲学辩论中，一个反复出现的主题占据主导地位：朴素实在论的反对者声称，这种观点与经验科学直接矛盾。我认为，尽管反对朴素现实主义的经验论据目前很受欢迎，但它们从根本上来说是有缺陷的。从经验科学发现到实质性哲学结论所需的非经验前提是天真的现实主义者所拒绝的。即使承认有争议的前提，鉴于其总体哲学承诺，实证研究结果也不会破坏该理论。因此，当代实证研究未能提供任何新的反对朴素实在论的论据。我的结论是，作为心灵哲学家，我们最好少花一点时间试图用经验科学作为棍棒来对抗我们的对手，而多花一点时间来研究彼此观点的含义——这是我们可以完美完成的事情坐在我们舒适的扶手椅上。