I argue that the main existing accounts of the relationship between the beauty of environmental entities and their moral standing are mistaken in important ways. Beauty does not, as has been suggested by optimists, confer intrinsic moral standing. Nor is it the case, as has been suggested by pessimists, that beauty at best provides an anthropocentric source of moral standing that is commensurate with other sources of pleasure. I present arguments and evidence that show that the appreciation of beauty tends to cause a transformational state of mind that is more valuable than mere pleasure, but that leads us to falsely represent beautiful entities as being sentient and, in turn, as having intrinsic moral standing. To this extent, beauty is not, then, a source of intrinsic moral standing; it’s a source of a more important anthropocentric value than has hitherto been acknowledged.

我认为，现有的关于环境实体之美与其道德地位之间关系的主要描述在重要方面是错误的。正如乐观主义者所暗示的那样，美并不赋予内在的道德地位。也不是像悲观主义者所暗示的那样，美至多提供了与其他快乐来源相称的以人类为中心的道德地位来源。我提出的论据和证据表明，对美的欣赏往往会导致一种转变的心态，这种心态比单纯的快乐更有价值，但这会导致我们错误地将美丽的实体描述为有知觉，进而认为它们具有内在的道德地位. 从这个意义上说，美不是内在道德地位的源泉。