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The real effects of disclosure regulation: Evidence from mandatory CFO compensation disclosure
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy ( IF 3.629 ) Pub Date : 2022-06-14 , DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2022.106995
Dichu Bao , Lixin (Nancy) Su , Yong Zhang

The 2006 SEC rule, by changing the definition of Named Executive Officers, mandates CFO compensation disclosure. Using this setting and a difference-in-differences research design, we study the real effects of CFO compensation disclosure regulation on CFO job performance. We hypothesize that the disclosure of CFO compensation information, by facilitating shareholder monitoring of the board in providing appropriate incentives to CFOs, leads to better CFO job performance in providing high-quality financial reports. The analyses support our prediction: the treatment firms, which start disclosing CFO compensation information under the 2006 rule, compared to the control firms, which already disclose CFO compensation before 2006, experience an improvement in CFO performance, as exhibited in decreases in accounting misstatements and unexplained audit fees. The results are more pronounced for firms with concentrated ownership, smaller compensation committees, and CFOs subject to weaker monitoring by audit committees. Overall, we provide evidence of a real effect resulting from mandatory CFO compensation disclosure.



中文翻译:

披露监管的真正影响:来自强制性 CFO 薪酬披露的证据

2006 年 SEC 规则通过更改指定执行官的定义,要求披露 CFO 薪酬。使用此设置和差异中的差异研究设计,我们研究了 CFO 薪酬披露规定对 CFO 工作绩效的实际影响。我们假设披露 CFO 薪酬信息,通过促进股东监督董事会为 CFO 提供适当的激励措施,可以提高 CFO 在提供高质量财务报告方面的工作绩效。分析支持我们的预测:与 2006 年之前已经披露 CFO 薪酬信息的控制公司相比,根据 2006 年规则开始披露 CFO 薪酬信息的治疗公司在 CFO 绩效方面有所改善,正如会计错报和无法解释的审计费用的减少所表明的那样。对于所有权集中、薪酬委员会规模较小的公司以及受审计委员会监督较弱的首席财务官而言,结果更为明显。总体而言,我们提供了强制性 CFO 薪酬披露产生的实际影响的证据。

更新日期:2022-06-14
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