Implementing precautionary measures that have obvious distributional consequences today but often only invisible future benefits is politically difficult. It requires that policymakers reconcile technocratic expertise with political consent. This paper traces attempts to enact such measures, focusing on countercyclical policies to limit the systemic risks of housing booms as proposed by financial stability committees in Germany, France, and the Netherlands from 2015 onwards. These committees bring together technocrats and political authorities in order to overcome the inaction bias inherent to these measures, seeking to forge both epistemic and political consensus on the need for action. We find that the work of these committees is characterized by lengthy processes of consensus-building, during which technocrats amass evidence and search for politically acceptable solutions. We argue that whether this leads to meaningful steps crucially depends on the committee's institutional set-up. What particularly matters is its capacity to engage the Ministry of Finance in binding discussions and the governance arrangements for the activation of precautionary instruments, which shape whether a shared framing of the problem and appropriate response emerges.

中文翻译：

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在技​​术官僚和政治之间：金融稳定委员会如何制定房地产市场的预防性干预措施

实施在今天具有明显的分配后果但往往只有无形的未来利益的预防措施在政治上是困难的。它要求政策制定者将技术官僚的专业知识与政治同意相协调。本文追溯了制定此类措施的尝试，重点关注德国、法国和荷兰金融稳定委员会从 2015 年起提出的限制房地产繁荣系统性风险的反周期政策。这些委员会将技术官僚和政治权威聚集在一起，以克服这些措施固有的不作为偏见，寻求就采取行动的必要性达成认知和政治共识。我们发现这些委员会的工作特点是建立共识的过程漫长，在此期间，技术官僚收集证据并寻找政治上可接受的解决方案。我们认为，这是否会导致有意义的步骤关键取决于委员会的机构设置。尤其重要的是它有能力让财政部参与具有约束力的讨论，以及启动预防工具的治理安排，这决定了是否会出现共同的问题框架和适当的应对措施。