Crispin Wright is widely known for having introduced epistemic entitlement, a species of non-evidential warrant, as a response to certain skeptical challenges. This paper investigates a fundamental issue concerning entitlement: it appears to be quite generous, as it appears to apply indiscriminately to anti-skepticial hypotheses as well as a range of radically different—indeed, even incompatible—propositions. It argues that the generosity of entitlement is reflective of an underlying commitment to a form of epistemic relativism. In addition, the paper presents an axiology that helps entitlement theorists to address the pressing issue of how, given the absence of evidence, there can be anything epistemically good about acceptance of anti-skeptical hypotheses and other cornerstones for inquiry. Lastly, the paper argues that the issues of generosity and epistemic relativism are rather deeply rooted: they surface at the level of value. It explains why.

中文翻译：

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权利、慷慨、相对主义和结构内在商品

Crispin Wright 因引入认识论而广为人知权利，一种非证据性的保证，作为对某些怀疑挑战的回应。本文研究了一个关于权利的基本问题：它似乎相当慷慨，因为它似乎不加选择地适用于反怀疑假设以及一系列完全不同的——实际上，甚至是不相容的——命题。它认为，权利的慷慨反映了对某种形式的认知相对主义的潜在承诺。此外，该论文提出了一种价值论，可帮助权利理论家解决紧迫的问题，即在没有证据的情况下，如何接受反怀疑假设和其他调查基石在认知上是有益的。最后，本文认为慷慨和认知相对主义的问题根深蒂固：它们在价值层面上浮现。它解释了原因。