This article examines the question of how a nation can combat corruption and collusion and prevent these practices from plaguing and undermining public procurement processes. This matter is especially important to Brazil where Operation Car Wash exposed widespread corruption and collusion affecting public procurement. Although focusing on Brazil, this article reflects on a broader academic and policy debate as to how a nation can escape from a ‘high-corruption’ equilibrium, especially one strengthened by its interaction with supplier collusion. In particular, whether endemic corruption can be combatted through an invigorated law enforcement push, combined with incremental reform, or whether some ‘big bang’ approach, with complete institutional overhaul, is required to establish a new equilibrium. The article notes that the Brazilian experience provides support for the hypothesis that, where corruption is endemic, better laws and law enforcement may be insufficient on their own to break a cycle and to remove the incentives and opportunities for corruption and collusion that exist. However, it also recognizes that, for many jurisdictions, wholesale big bang reform is unlikely to be feasible. It thus proposes a multi-pronged, and self-reinforcing, set of reforms to trigger change, concentrated on weaknesses diagnosed in the system. In particular, it suggests that where corruption affects public procurement, beyond specific adjustments to procurement, competition and anti-corruption laws, procurers, anti-corruption and competition enforcement agencies need to work closely together to coordinate policies, achieve synergies and to combat incentives and opportunities for corruption and collusion within procurement processes. Such reforms must be combined with measures to tackle broader factors contributing to systemic corruption. Although inspired by the Brazilian case study, the diagnosis and proposed reform strategy provides a workable model for use in other jurisdictions.

中文翻译：

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打击公共采购中的腐败和勾结：洗车行动的教训

本文探讨了一个国家如何打击腐败和勾结并防止这些做法困扰和破坏公共采购流程的问题。这件事对巴西尤为重要，因为洗车行动暴露了影响公共采购的普遍腐败和勾结。尽管关注巴西，但本文反映了更广泛的学术和政策辩论，即一个国家如何摆脱“高度腐败”的平衡，尤其是通过与供应商勾结的互动而得到加强的平衡。尤其是，是否可以通过加强执法力度，结合渐进式改革来打击地方性腐败，或者是否需要某种“大爆炸”方法以及彻底的制度改革来建立新的平衡。文章指出，巴西的经验支持了这样一种假设，即在腐败盛行的地方，仅靠更好的法律和执法可能不足以打破循环并消除存在的腐败和勾结的诱因和机会。然而，它也承认，对于许多司法管辖区来说，大规模的大爆炸式改革不太可能是可行的。因此，它提出了一套多管齐下、自我强化的改革，以引发变革，重点关注系统中诊断出的弱点。特别是，它建议在腐败影响公共采购的情况下，除了对采购、竞争和反腐败法律进行具体调整之外，采购商、反腐败和竞争执法机构需要密切合作以协调政策，实现协同效应，打击采购流程中腐败和串通的诱因和机会。此类改革必须与解决导致系统性腐败的更广泛因素的措施相结合。尽管受到巴西案例研究的启发，但诊断和提议的改革战略为其他司法管辖区提供了一个可行的模型。