Despite the importance of information technology (IT) innovation in today’s digitalized world, little research attention has been paid to examining how firms can incentivize IT innovation. To fill this gap, the current study investigates the impact of managerial incentives provided to chief executive officers (CEOs) on IT innovation, measured by the number of IT patents. In particular, we examine the role of risk-taking incentives provided to CEOs, captured by the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (i.e., Vega). Vega can motivate CEOs to engage in risky IT innovation projects by aligning their wealth with firm-specific risk. In so doing, we focus on how CEOs’ IT-related human capital (i.e., IT education and IT experience) moderates the relationship between Vega and IT innovation. Our empirical analyses reveal that a higher Vega encourages CEOs to support more IT innovation; more importantly, the impact of Vega on the amount of IT patents is stronger for firms with CEOs who have higher levels of IT education and IT experience. Our study contributes to research and practice by conceptualizing a CEO’s IT-related human capital and validating its moderating role in the relationship between risk-taking incentives provided to the CEO and the amount of IT innovation.

中文翻译：

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CEO 冒险激励与 IT 创新：CEO 与 IT 相关的人力资本的调节作用

尽管信息技术 (IT) 创新在当今数字化世界中非常重要，但很少有研究关注企业如何激励 IT 创新。为了填补这一空白，目前的研究调查了提供给首席执行官 (CEO) 的管理激励措施对 IT 创新的影响，以 IT 专利数量衡量。特别是，我们研究了提供给 CEO 的冒险激励的作用，通过 CEO 财富对股票回报波动率（即 Vega）的敏感性来捕捉。Vega 可以通过将他们的财富与公司特定的风险相结合，来激励 CEO 参与有风险的 IT 创新项目。在此过程中，我们关注 CEO 的 IT 相关人力资本（即 IT 教育和 IT 经验）如何调节 Vega 和 IT 创新之间的关系。我们的实证分析表明，更高的 Vega 会鼓励 CEO 支持更多的 IT 创新；更重要的是，Vega 对 IT 专利数量的影响对于 CEO 具有较高 IT 教育水平和 IT 经验的公司来说更强。我们的研究通过概念化 CEO 的 IT 相关人力资本并验证其在提供给 CEO 的风险承担激励与 IT 创新数量之间的关系中的调节作用，有助于研究和实践。