Wireless networks are susceptible to malicious attacks, especially those involving eavesdropping. In this letter, we consider a new type of anti-eavesdropping strategy which, beyond the basic goal of increasing the secrecy rate, also wants to achieve this in the most unpredictable way for the adversary. We model the problem by a non-zero sum game where a control center (called the transmitter) must communicate with a group of nodes allocated in security zone in the presence of an adversary intent on eavesdropping upon this communication. The transmitter wants to find a trade-off between two goals: (a) to increase the expected secrecy rate, and (b) to maintain such secret communication in the most unpredictable way for the adversary. As a metric for unpredictability of the transmitter we consider the Shannon entropy of its strategy. We model this problem by a nonzero-sum, two-player resource allocation game. The equilibrium is found in closed form, and its dependence on communication network parameters is illustrated. Finally, weighting coefficients for the basic and secondary goals of the transmitter are optimized based on proportional fairness criteria.

中文翻译：

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复杂的反窃听策略

无线网络容易受到恶意攻击，尤其是涉及窃听的攻击。在这封信中，我们考虑了一种新型的反窃听策略，除了提高保密率的基本目标之外，还希望以最不可预测的方式为对手实现这一目标。我们通过非零和博弈对问题进行建模，其中控制中心（称为发射器）必须与分配在安全区域中的一组节点进行通信，而对手存在窃听此通信的意图。发送者希望在两个目标之间找到一个折衷：(a) 提高预期的保密率，以及 (b) 以最不可预测的方式为对手维持这种秘密通信。作为发射机不可预测性的度量，我们考虑其策略的香农熵。我们通过非零和、两人资源分配游戏来模拟这个问题。该平衡以封闭形式找到，并说明了其对通信网络参数的依赖性。最后，根据比例公平标准优化发射机基本目标和次要目标的加权系数。