Comparativism maintains that physical quantities are ultimately relational in character. For example, an object’s having 1 kg rest mass depends on the relations it stands in to other objects in the universe. Comparativism, its advocates allege, reveals that quantities are not metaphysically mysterious: Quantities are reducible to familiar relations holding among physical objects. Modal accounts of intrinsicality—such as Lewis’s duplication account or Langton and Lewis’s combinatorial account—are popular accounts preserving many of our core intuitions regarding which properties are intrinsic. I argue that to endorse both comparativism and a modal account of intrinsicality, we must reject the plausible thesis that determinable properties are instantiated solely in virtue of their determinates. I call this ‘the determinacy tension’ and I suggest approaches for dissolving it.

比较主义认为物理量最终在性质上是相关的。例如，一个物体的静止质量为 1 kg，取决于它与宇宙中其他物体的关系。其倡导者声称，比较主义揭示了数量在形而上学上并不神秘：数量可以简化为物理对象之间的熟悉关系。内在性的模态说明——例如刘易斯的重复说明或兰顿和刘易斯的组合说明——是流行的说明，保留了我们关于哪些属性是内在的许多核心直觉。我认为，为了支持比较主义和对内在性的模态解释，我们必须拒绝这样一个看似合理的论点，即可确定的属性仅凭借它们的确定性来实例化。